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Abstract 
 
With internet expanding in every aspect of businesses infrastructure, it becomes more and more 
important to make these businesses infrastructures safe and secure to the numerous attacks 
perpetrated on them conspicuously when it comes to denial of service (DoS) attacks. A Dos attack can 
be summarized as an effort carried out by either a person or a group of individual to suppress a 
particular outline service.  
 
This can hence be achieved by using and manipulating packets which are sent out using the IP 
protocol included into the IP address of the sending party. However, one of the major drawbacks is 
that the IP protocol is not able to verify the accuracy of the address and has got no method to validate 
the authenticity of the sender’s packet. Knowing how this works, an attacker can hence fabricate any 
source address to gain unauthorized access to critical information. In the event that attackers can 
manipulate this lacking for numerous targeted attacks, it would be wise and safe to determine whether 
the network traffic has got spoofed packets and how to traceback. IP traceback has been quite active 
specially with the DOS attacks therefore this paper will be focusing on the different types of attacks 
involving spoofed packets and also numerous methods that can help in identifying whether packet 
have spoofed source addresses based on both active and passive host based methods and on the 
router-based methods. 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
Referring to RFC 1791, (1981) packets that are sent out using the IP protocol include the IP address of the 
sender. After receiving this packet, the recipient directs replies to the sender using the original source 
address. Nonetheless, the correctness of this address is not verified by the IP protocol that unfortunately has 
no way of validating the packet’s source if not only been based on the sender’s IP address. Therefore this 
involves that an attacker can at any pointing time fake the source address and act as a legitimate party to 
gain access to unauthorized details or information. Most of the time sending spoofed packet is carried out 
to legitimately access unauthorized information. 
 
Spoofing of network traffic can certainly occur at many different layers. One of the layers that could be 
affected by is the network layer which is responsible in dealing with MAC spoofing or at a non IP transport 
layer such as IPX, NetBEUI or even at an application layer in the instance of Email spoofing. 
 
Even through tough access control technologies such as firewalls which are mainly used in protecting the 
network, they are helpless when it comes to specific attacks ranging from SYN-flood, TCP connection 
spoofing, Smurf and many more. Subsequently with these attacks increasing, more and more companies are 
now turning towards deploying Intrusion Detection System (IDS) onto their network. However, it does 
detect the network attacks and hence display the alerts but unfortunately does not identify the attacker’s 
source. This is quite enigmatic especially when it comes to DOS attacks because the attacker normally can 
remain masked due to the fact that these attacks, the attacker does not have to interact with the targeted host 
as s/he does not need to receive any packet as s/he is initialing the attack. The focus of this report is to 
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illustrate an overview of the numerous ways that can be used to determine whether the received IP packets 
on the network has been spoofed and if so, how to trace them back to their originators or their source 
addresses. This process is most common known as IP traceback. The main concept behind the IP traceback 
is to determine the exact IP address of the source from which the attacks are being launched. Despite that 
this can normally be gathered by locating the IP address field from the IP packet, the attacker can 
unfortunately easily manipulate and changed these details, thus masking its original and true identity. 
 
However, the concept of IP traceback is not well defined as to what it normally should be performing. Its 
purpose is mainly to identify the true IP address and the source of its attacker, in other words, the ability of 
identifying the source of a particular IP packet, its destination and an approximate time of reception of the 
packet. IP traceback can hence be summarized as belonging to two different methods: proactive and 
reactive. 
Proactive Tracking Methodology 
 
This method would involve detecting and tracing attacks when packets are in transit. If packet tracing is 
needed, the victim can therefore refer to this information to identify the attacking source. However the 
proactive methods can be further split into two different proactive methods namely marking and packet 
messaging respectfully and described below 
Packet Marking:  
This would involve packets that contain information about each and every router that they go 
through as they (IP packets) has through the network. Therefore, this means that the receiver of the 
designated packet can make use of the information held by the router to trace back packet’s route to 
its originator. It is imperative that routers can imprint and sign packets without interrupting the 
normal packet processing. 
Message Marking:  
In this particular approach, the different routers, through which the packets travel across, generate 
and broadcast messages with call the information about the forwarding nodes that a particular packet 
transit across. 
Reactive Tracking Methodology 
 
The reactive tracing method operates differently to the proactive one. In this approach, the tracing will only 
commence when an attack has been perpetrated and following its detection. However, the numerous trials 
in developing a practical traceback algorithm and packet matching techniques have tried to resolve these 
dilemmas. Among those analyzed approaches are hop-by-hop tracing, IPSec authentication and monitoring 
traffic patterns matching.  
 
The focus of this paper will be to identify the various types of attacks involved with spoofed packets and 
also how to analyze the tracking back of suspicious packets to their originator(s). Whilst, accessing the 
routers logs about all the data packets that have been passed through and even to other nodes. However, the 
methodology used in this particular approach will be reactive and using the hop-by-hop tracing with a 
probabilistic packet marking scheme. 
IP TRACEBACK: 
 
During the past decade, a lot of attention has been focused on the security of Internet infrastructure in place 
as being part of transmission, reception and storage of paramount importance within the increasing e-
commerce applications. Yet, with high-profile Distributed Denial-of Service (DDOS) attacks, numerous 
ways have been elaborated to identify the source of these attacks and one methodological approach is using 
IP traceback. 
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Normally, IP traceback is not restricted to only DOS or DDOS attacks but with the ability to forge the IP 
address of those packets make the identification of the originator even harder and in such routine 
approaches of locating the system (attacker) with a given IP address (e.g. Traceroute) is no longer feasible 
due to the fact that the packet has already been spoofed. Belenky, A. & Ansari, N. (2003) implies that more 
advanced approaches of locating the source of attacking packets are needed. They also mentioned that 
identify the source of the offending packet would not necessarily means identifying the attack originator as 
these packets may be a host linked in a chain a reflector, a zombie or a device that by the attacker at an 
earlier stage. However, they did mention that IP traceback approaches are not meant to impede or cease 
those attacks but they are used to identify the source(s) of the initial incriminating packets during and after 
the attack. 
IP TRACEBACK CLASSIFICATION: 
End-host IP Traceback 
Probalistic Packet marking (PPM) 
This approach is structured around the routers that imprint the packets that flow through them 
through either their address or part of their address. This is normally carried out in a randomly 
process. This PPM technique also known as hop-by-hop tracing introduced by Savage, S. et al. 
(2001) originally and hence been improved by Song, D.X. & Derrig, A. (2001) in its coding and 
security was primarily targeted at both DOS and DDOS. 
 
Figure 1 below gives an overview of how the PPM works where attacker would launch an attack 
towards victim A and as shown in Figure 1, assuming that the packet travel path is R1, R2, R4 and 
R12, each router enforcing PPM recognize the packet flow and prior to routing them to their 
destinator, it probalistically imprint them with its partial address – i.e. the router’s partial address 
into to IP address header. Therefore when the victim acknowledges reception of enough packets, it 
can then remodel the addresses of all PPM-enabled packets and hence reconstruct the attack path. 
Obviously to reconstruct the whole attack path, a large number of packets would be required as well 
as the reconstruction of the data frames. 
 
We do note that PPM can deal with the modification of packet which are directed to the victim. But, 
when it comes to packet generation transformation by a reflector, traceback will only be obviously, 
the traffic will become fragmented and will be corrupted without having whatsoever impact on the 
traceback. This means that when fragmentation takes place, usually the ID field is the field that is 
being marked and if only a single fraction of the source is marked, the reassembly process will not 
be possible at the destination. Even that this might pose a problem, traceback would still be in a 
position of retracing the path due to the fact that the marking would have taken place before the 
reassembly process. This is resolved by opting for a much reduced option in the marking of the 
packets but that need to be understood is that on doing so, this will definitely increases the number 
of packets needed for reconstructing the path. 
 
Another issue with PPM is when using tunneling technology, it must be ensured that the markings 
are not removed prior to the headers are removed. 
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Figure 1 Probalistic packet marking (Belenky, A. & Ansari, N. (2003)) 
 
ICMP Traceback 
 
With the ICMP traceback, the concept of tracking down the full pathway of the intrusion is completely 
different from PPM. In figure 2 there is an illustration of how an ICMP traceback schema operates. 
According to Belenky, A. & Ansari, N. (2003)  every router on the network is set up in such a way that 
they have the ability to pick any packet at random (one in every 20,000 packets recommended) and hence 
produce an ICMP traceback message which would be targeted to the corresponding destination of the 
selected packet. The ICMP traceback message would normally consist of the following information: 
 
i) The previous hop, 
ii) The next hop, 
iii) A timestamp of the packet 
 
However, since there are numerous bytes of the traced packet which are possible, which are duplicated in 
the payload of the traceback message. Therefore the Time-To-Live (TTL) field is extended to 255 in order 
to be used in identifying the attack pathway with the ICMP traceback; the routers sitting on the network 
pathway will produce a completely new packet with an ICMP traceback message. The entire opposite of 
how PPM would handle this situation. The traceback information was entirely in-band. If we go by the 
assumption that the victim is under a DOS attack it would definitely means that the volume of packets 
going through would be huge hence afterward capturing all the addresses of the different routers on the 
attack pathway that generate the traceback message. 
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Figure 2 shows the process of the ICMP Traceback (Belenky, A. & Ansari, N. (2003) 
 
Wu. F.S et al. (2001) did mention that while this methodological approach is quite conducive and probably 
secure, the probability of getting a meaningful traceback message is very minimal if a major DDOS attack 
is cascaded onto the victim mainly if proper attention been meticulously invested in minimizing the 
chances of detecting the traceback messages. 
 
However, this can be resolved by associating a particular score to every traceback message created. If there 
is any allocation, the value will be affected therefore, to deploy and implement the traceback and its attack 
path reconstruction based on the ICMP traceback will involve a change in the organization’s routing tables 
of the routers sitting onto the network. We need to keep in mind that prior to start tracing back the attack, 
all the software of the routers would need to undergo upgrades from their respective vendors and then only 
the ICMP traceback must be activated at the Internet Service Provider (ISP) interaction. Furthermore, with 
ICMP traceback, routers can be set up individually thus allowing good scalability. The number of packets 
required for reconstructing the attack pathway is planned and based on thousands since the chances of 
producing an ICMP traceback message is 1/2000 an for partial stratagem to be effective, the victim must be 
conscious about the network topology and the routing of the network. We also have to keep in mind that 
the reconstruction of data frames would consist of thousand entries thus leading to require enormous 
memory to process those entries. If in case that a router that is responsible for the marking of the packets 
happen to be corrupted, it can hence be reprogrammed to produce incorrect traceback messages thus giving 
out false reconstruction attacks pathways. Based upon Wu. F.S. et al. (2001) described in his report that 
handling major DDOS attacks with ICMP Traceback was possible but would not be true if a large number 
of reflectors were to be used. Therefore, the capability very similar to Probalistic Packet Marking thus 
leading to the conclusion that transformation involving reflector prove to be more difficult thus confining 
the limit of the traceback to the reflector. 
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Packet Logging IP Traceback: 
 
According to Snoeren, A.C et al, (2002), this scheme is more commonly known as Source Path Isolation 
Engine (SPIE). With packet logging also referred as hash-based traceback, every single router on the 
network keep some data or information of every single that have passed through that particular router so 
that later, it can hence determine if that packet have already been through. The mechanism though which 
that hash-based IP traceback operate is that routers on the network are called data generation agent (DGAs) 
and since that network is symmetrically divided into zones. In each and every zone, SPIE collection and 
reduction agent (SCARs) are linked to all DGAs thus allow a communication link to be established as 
depicted in figure 3. Also the SPIE traceback Manager (STM) is a central unit that has a link to IDS of the 
victims. 
 
So basically when packets flows across the network, partial information of packets get captured and stored 
in the DGAs. This partial information consist of the IP header and the initial 8 bytes of the payload of each 
packet is hashed and then recorded in bloom filter which reaching 70% of its capacity is archived for later 
analysis and a new one is used. However, these bloom filters are used during the capturing stage and to the 
time taken to use of these bloom filter is known as a time period. Having said so, DGAs can capture any 
transformations that occurs an influence on the field. Normally the type of transformation and the 
information required to reconstruct the attack pathway are recorded in a Transform Lookup Table (TLT) 
which each bloom filter has it’s won TLT for it time period. 
 
Therefore when the STM is notified of an attack from the victim’s IDS, appropriate request are transmitted 
to SCAR which in turn look up for recorded partial information and transformation tables from DGAs from 
the allocated time period. After analyzing and comparing the tables, SCAR will be able to trace which 
router in the zone forwarded that packet. It is then the responsibility of the scar to retrace the router through 
which the packet has been going through and finally send a report to the STM. With this schematic hash-
based IP Traceback approach, it can easily handle massive DDOS attacks. It is quite normal that a bigger 
amount of memory is required by the SCAR and the STM which is dedicated to the traceback processes. 
Given that this scheme is extremely difficult to bypass, is can therefore handle more or less any packet 
transformation.    
 
Specialized Routing IP Traceback: 
 
With this approach, the introduction of Tracking Router (TR) onto the network checks all the traffic that 
flows through the network and this is achieved by routing all the packets through the TR. This is then 
realized by creating a Generic Route Encapsulation (GRE) from every interface of the router to the TR. 
This architecture is illustrated in Figure 3 with the TR in the centre and with all of the edge routers on the 
network connected to with GRE tunnels using a star-like logical network is known as an overlay network. 
 
However a single TR will not be capable of handling this load of packet from the entire network thus 
having several TRs which can still be logically implemented as a single TR that will be using signature-
based intrusion detection. With this approach, if an attack is sensed, this means that the source of the attack 
can be traced back because it is only one hop away according to Belenky, A. & Ansari, N. (2003). 
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Figure 3. depicts the overlay network (Belenky, A. & Ansari, N. 2003) 
 
This method make use of the most common features that are available on routers of today consequently the 
involvement of ISP is massive as it will have carry out a traceback and identify the source of the attack on 
its own. 
 
Nevertheless this approach does have an extreme condition; it will only function within a single domain, 
therefore for the overlay network to be effective over ISPs, it would be wise to connect all the TRs into a 
single system. Of course with the method, a single packet is necessary to traceback an attack provided that 
the attack has been identified and reported. This then happen as soon as the IDS sitting on the TR identified 
the attack, it would trace it to its endpoint of the GRE tunnel. Now, if the edge router has numerous 
interfaces then it would be impossible to know exactly from which interfaces the attack was launched. 
However with this approach has a give-and-take collaboration between overhead and protection. But if the 
tunnels are mounted with IPSec, consequently the overhead bandwidth will increase and so will the level of 
protection. Moreover, this approach would be suitable to manage extensive DDOS attacks where tracing 
back the source of any particular packet ever to the edge of the network. Also handling packet 
transformation will not be a problem with this method. 
IPSec Traceback with IPSec 
 
This method is normally introduced as forming part of an intrusion detection structure specially designed 
for network based mask known as DECIDUOUS Chang H.Y et al. (1999). Given that this particular 
framework is far beyond the scope of this report, the method of operation in detecting the source address of 
any attack is of great significance. Therefore this approach relies on the fact that the complete network 
structure is of understanding and control to the system. This denotes that if at any pointing time there is an 
IPSec security involvement between an inconsistent router and the victim. However, if the identified 
packets are picked up by the security associations, therefore the initial attack is further than this router but 
if the opposite happens, if the identified packets are not detected, it will denote that the origin of the attack 
lied between this router and its victim. Thus allowing us to possibly identify a single or a group of routers 
from where the attack was launched. 
 
Following the explanation, in figure 4 below when an attack is sensed, an IPSec security association 
between Router 4 (R4) and victim denoted by the letter ‘V’. In fact if ‘A’ being an attacker, his or her 
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attack packets will have to flow through the network and the tunnel thus requesting them to be 
authenticating before hopping through the tunnel. Then the tunnel from Router 1 (R1) to the victim is 
created. It is also noted that from Router 4 (R4) to the victim point ‘V’ there will be 2 tunnels that will 
encapsulate data traffic from the attacker. (This is not actually represented onto the figure 4) 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrating the IPSec Traceback approach (Belenky, A. & Ansari, N. 2003) 
 
The second tunnel will perform its encapsulation over the first tunnel. Moreover, using two security 
associations to authenticate the traffic flow, it is obvious that if the attack was initiated behind RA but if the 
attack were to be authenticated by the only first tunnel then it would clearly identify the attacker would lies 
between Router 1 (R1) and Router 4 (R4) it would be on Router 2 (R2). 
 
The system, however, will undergo numerous possible iterations in order to consider all the viable 
pathways before determining with which routers the victim should lean on for the IPSec security 
associations given that the source address is unknown. With this approach, the only interaction would come 
from the ISP which will have to communicate its network topology to its entire client in order to create the 
IPSec tunnels to the routers. Yet we to understand that in case ‘shared key’ authentication is used, every 
systems need to be aware of any changes on any routers on the network. We also assume that the 
authentication process will include digital certificate to be used at security associations. It is also to mention 
that with this approach the number of packets to perform traceback is low compared to the previously 
discussed methods.  
 
This approach is very secure and even packet transformation is not an issue, being even capable of tracing 
back major DDOS attacks by tracing the path individually but we have to understand that when DDOS 
attacks are being performed, DDOS can themselves be targeted since ISPs have to remain open for clients 
to create IPSec tunnels thus making it unsuitable to manage complex DDOS attacks. 
SPOOFED PACKET ATTACKS: 
 
Packet spoofing can actually be part of different and various attacks type. So having the knowledge of how 
they operate would definitely reveal itself to be fruitful as then we know how they behave. One of the 
major aspect in whichever packet spoofing attack types, it does not have to receive packet replies from the 
targeted source. Therefore this part of this report will elaborate on the different types of attacks and discept 
their security associations. 
SMURF Attack 
According to Computer Emergency Response Team (1998), SMURF attack can be defined as an invasion 
on the network that floods that network with a huge amount of requests that unfortunately disrupt the 
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normal traffic. This is hence carried out by sending spoofed ICMP echo requests (ping) packet to a subnet 
broadcast. Therefore when a broadcast address is picked up by all the nodes on the subnet, this will then 
drive each active host to send an echo reply to the source where here in this attack. The source address is 
directed to the address of the target. This then amplifies causing a huge amount of packet to be generated 
and directed towards the target. This would definitely congest the network thus causing a major 
degeneration of the service on its network. Again Smurf attack is much more concerned with the 
multiplication of the packets and address spoofing to overflow the targeted network. Moreover, packet 
return is of no importance to the attacker as it is not desired. For successfully accomplish this type of 
attack, the attacker should be able to grab the broadcast address and then create to ICMP echo requests 
which unfortunately are broadly available. 
SYN-Flood Attack 
SYN-Flood attacks the most classic denial-of-service (DOS) attack where as mentioned earlier return 
packets are irrelevant. With SYN-Flood attacks, the attacker has to continually send a huge number of TCP 
SYN packets to the target which the host in return will acknowledge by sending an acknowledgement 
packet to the pretended sender. The sending host will wait for an acknowledgement reply which will never 
be sent out by the attacker forcing the host to engage in an undetermined wait thus causing the buffer on the 
target host to be tied up. Eventually when the entire buffer is used, no further network connection would be 
possible. Obviously the connection will finish by timing-out where the kernel will release the buffer and 
allow for new connections. Because of the huge amount of packet sent earlier in the SYN-Flood by the 
attacker is more likely to use the buffer again rather than a normal packet from a genuine connection. This 
SYN-Flood attack is not interested with the return packets but for the attack to be successful, the attacker 
will have to spoof source addresses from host that are non-existent or inactive. 
Bounce Scanning  
Using scanning in general resides a difficulty that the attacker must be able to view the replies and hence 
make it quite complex to use spoofed addresses. One of the easiest ways of achieving this type of attack is 
to spoof the address of a different computer on your network subdivision and hence listen to the network 
traffic for echo to the spoofed address. Following a report published by security focus (2001), a brilliant 
option would be to make use of spoofed packets and then to unwillingly listen to the targeted replies. 
 
This particular type of attack normally exploit the IP header known as the “identification number” field. 
This number is usually incremented by one each time that a packet is sent over. Therefore the bounce attack 
makes use of that to send spoofed SYN packets to the targeted host through a part. However, Wu, S. et al 
(1998) mentioned that of the port is closed, a reply is generated back with a reset. Where on action is 
undertaken when it is received by the spoofed host. After all in the case that the port is opened, the target 
still replies back to the spoofed source through an acknowledgement. However given that the spoofed host 
is not responsible for launching the SYN-flood attack, it therefore transmit a reset to the target whilst still 
incrementing the IP id number. 
 
For these particular attacks to be successful there are 3 main factors that need to be considered: 
 
1) Scrutinize the spoofed host requesting to locate it actual id number. 
2) Direct the spoofed scan packet to the targeted source. 
3) Reconfirm the id number of the spoofed host 
 
Once these 3 main areas have been achieved by the attacker, s/he can easily determine whether the targeted 
host’s port was either open or closed denoted by the id member incrementing by one would return port was 
closed and if it were to incremented by 2 then this would mean that the port was opened. 
 
However, the attacker has to make sure that other packets are not directed to the spoofed host during the 
scanning, this is therefore achieved by either selecting a host to spoof with some or no network activity at 
all and such example would be a printer onto the network. On the other hand, if the spoofed host does not 
show any increase in the id numbers by at least one, the attacker can therefore make use of a multitude of 
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queries to each port and therefore deduce its mode by monitoring the changes occurring with the id 
numbers. 
TCP Spoofing 
What make TCP connection spoofing attack quite unique is that it is a combination and coordination of 
more than one attack. This would mean creating a DOS attack on one hand and on the other hand spoofing 
packets of the attack target. SO, basically to conduct a DOS attack on a trusted host could be anything that 
would prevent the trusted host to send out reset packet to the host in the instance of a SYN-Flood attack. 
The other form of attack would require the device to be transmitting spoofed packet to the target while 
impersonating the source host. Moreover, due to the DOS being launch prior to sending the spoofed packet 
to the target, the trusted host unfortunately cannot reply to the packets being received from the target. In 
addition the attacker can forcefully lead the target to believe that the send packets are from a trusted source 
thus later allowing the attacker to use the target to act as a trusted host at a pointing time. 
 
However, this type of attack is quite complex and hence does require some knowledge as TCP does require 
reply packets to carry the sequence number of the former packet if the attacker cannot examine the packet, 
therefore she/he would have to guess the sequence number which could be made very hard to guess but is 
still feasible to achieve. 
Zombie Control attack 
McNevin, T. (2005), a DDOS has two primary goals, firstly to flood the victim’s server and secondly to 
consume the most of the bandwidth of the victim. Nonetheless DDOS attacks normally consist of 
attacker(s), several intermediary computers, and finally many “zombies”. Zombies are when an attacker has 
been able to infiltrate other computers through their weaknesses. Once the attacker has gain control of the 
machine, she/he can install tools, or programs that will allow that attacker the ability to communicate back 
and with other zombies. McNevin, T. (2005) also pointed out that it is very probable that an attacker might 
go thought the process of recruiting numerous zombies over an indefinite period of time and when the 
attacker have build up a huge network of zombies begin flooding packets towards its victim(s). In other 
words when the attacker decide to launch his or her attack, the initiator(s) will hence convey the message to 
the intermediary computers which will trigger the zombies to start flooding insignificant data in the 
diversion of the victim. However, this data traffic flow is not always ludicrous as the attacker may mask 
their traffic to appear like genuine and appropriate traffic to overcome any filtering defenses in detecting 
packet attacks. 
 
Above are some of the ways through which spoofed packets could be used for different 
DOS or DDOS attacks. It is somehow useful to know if the packets have been spoofed or 
not as it will definitely help in mitigating attacks, or even help to traceback the true attack 
source. 
SPOOFED PACKETS DETECTION METHODS 
 
Spoofed packet detection methods can be categorized as of those depending upon router sustenance, 
passive host based, active host-based methods and finally upon administrative methods which is one of 
most frequently used methodology. This implies that when an attack occurs, the responsible personnel at 
the attacked location will liaise contact with the authorized personnel at the supposedly attack site and ask 
for an acknowledgement which is totally delicate. Therefore, the need of having computerized ways and 
means of detecting whether IP packets have been spoofed. This section of this report will have a closer look 
into the different methods and approaches in detecting spoofed packets. 
ROUTING APPROACHES AND METHODS 
 
Routers are devices that can identify IP addresses and through which network interface to they originally 
come from and can also point out packets that should not have been received by an interface. This therefore 
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means that a router will definitely be able to identify if addresses are either for the internal or external 
network. Nonetheless, if the router is addressed with IP packets with external IP address on an internal 
interface and vice versa, therefore it may come to the conclusion that the packet source has probably been 
faked. 
 
Recently with DOS attacks including spoofed attack packets, methods to counter measure these treats have 
been developed and are put in place filtering methods are being implemented most commonly known as 
Ingress Filtering, which filter inbound packets thus protecting from outside attacks. Similarly for filtering 
outbound traffic known as Egress Filtering which prevent internal machine to be compromised from 
spoofed attacks. Yet, if all the routers would have that sort of filtering in place, both Ingress and/or Egress 
then it would push an attacker to corrupt that router. However, internal routers with an adequate 
understanding of the inside and outside can spot fake packets but with the implementation of certain 
network topologies, unnecessary pathways make its confusing, thus making use of host based methods to 
detect the spoofed packet at the router’s level. 
 
Templeton J.S & Levitt K.E. (2000) mentioned that IANA does control a certain number of IP addresses 
for special purposes. Table 1 does illustrate those special IP addresses and what they used for. Most 
firewalls will then compares that table with the packets they’re handling. Nevertheless this method dose 
poses a constraint and can only be used only when IP packets are being thrown through. Yet an attacker 
cold still fake packets if on the same Ethernet subnet as both the IP and the MAC address would be 
spoofed. Therefore the need for other approaches is needed. 
NON – ROUTING APPROACHES AND METHODS 
ACTIVE DETECTION METHODS 
With the active detection methods inquiries are performed to identify the originating source of the packet 
(reactive) or influence protocol specific guideline for the sender to take action upon (proactive). These 
different approaches do have an enormous advantage over the routing approaches and methods discussed 
earlier as there is no involvement of ISPs and prove to be impressive and operative even through the 
attacker may be sitting on the same subnet as the targeted host. 
 
The active methods normally will depend on an acknowledgement from the claimed source but only if the 
spoofed host is operational that in can be influenced meaning that only when linked to the network 
gathering and handling packets. It is to mention that if a host is fully firewalled thus not replying to quests 
is then deduced to be inactive. However, these hosts are frequently manipulated as source addresses in 
spoofed packets. Therefore when hosts do not reply to any requests, passive methods is then used for 
acknowledgement and validation. 
Time-To-Live (TTL) Approach 
Since IP packets are normally routed across the network, their time-to-live (TTL) is subject to decrease. 
Therefore, the IP packet header can be controlled to make sure that IP packets are not being routed 
interminably when their host cannot be located in a fix number of hops according to Stevens W.R (1994). 
This technique is also used by some networked devices to halt IP packets from being transmitted outside a 
host’s subnet. Moreover, Templeton J.S & Levitt K.E. (2000) mentioned that TTL is a useful approach and 
method in detecting spoofed packet but are based upon the following assumptions. 
 
1. The number of hops will be the same then a packet is sent between two hosts provided the same 
routing path is taken 
2. Packet transmitted near in time to each other will use the same trace route to its destination 
3. Routes rarely changes 
4. Whenever routes are altered, there is no compelling modification in the number of hops.  
 
Having described the above assumptions, these mentioned approaches might outcome in false alerts if these 
assumptions are not respected. Hence repeatedly checking the packets should not breach those assumptions. 
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Direct TTL Requests: 
With direct TTL, the mechanism of operation is quite simply by sending out a packet to a host that will 
have induce an acknowledgement, we can verify whether the TTL from the acknowledgement is identical 
to the one that was transmitted as it they are from the same protocol, they usually will have the same TTL 
thus considering the fact that different protocols would definitely use different basic TTL. However when 
different protocols are used then it is imperative that we deduce the true hop count. In the instance of 
TCP/UDP, 64 and 128 are the most commonly used whereas with ICMP, the initial value used are 128 and 
255 respectively the number of hops can be calculated by subtracting the monitored TTL from the assumed 
value, we can then deduce the number of hops. 
 
After all if an attacker does happen to have the same number of hops, this approach will return a false 
negative, but if the attacker was to be aware fo the exact number of hops between the faked host and target, 
it fake the TTL field 
OS Fingerprinting 
OS fingerprinting can be classified into 2 different categories, active fingerprinting which is associated with 
the direct probing of computer, and passive fingerprinting which refers to initially monitor the traffic and 
hence forth analyzing it to the various standardized benchmark for various operating system. On the other 
hand, we can create a controlled passive fingerprint as we monitor the traffic from a host and afterwards 
examine this against an active OS fingerprinting. Thus ascertaining if both OS are likely to be the same but 
if that is not the case, we then deduce that the packets are faked. 
TCP Flow Control 
In general a TCP header does have a send window size (SWS) which is the upper bound on the number 
outstanding frames that the sender can transmit (not the ACKed) or the maximum number or amount of 
data that the sender can receive. So, if even those SWS are to be set to zero, then the sender should stop 
transmitting data. But it is very important that the sender respond to the flow control by acknowledging the 
ACK-packets. Other wise the sender should terminate once the very first window size is over flowed else 
we could infer that the packets are spoofed. To make sure that this is not to occur, the sender can transmit a 
primary window size that is quite small thus if this margin is exceeded, the conclusion would be that the 
packets have been faked. 
 
However, TCP packet spoofing is quite hard to achieve as the correct sequence number to a lot of TCP 
packets is required and most of the TCP connection don’t get pass the initial acknowledgement packet 
(ACK-PK) Therefore the best way for this to be effective is in the handshake process. The TCP handshake 
normally requests that the host transmitting initiate that first SYN wait for the SYN-ACK before 
transmitting the first ACK packet. Modifying the wonder size of the ACK-SYN to zero, would indicate 
whether the sender is accepting and reacting to the packets. Moreover, if the sender just return an ACK-PK 
certain that true originator is not addressing to our packets and hence a spoofed packet 
TCP Approach and Methods  
When it comes to detect spoofed TCP packets, a number of approaches and methods on top of the IP packet 
methods described later. The role of the TCP is to maintain reliable packet transmission which implies that 
both sender and receiver should be communicating. Thus allowing us to uncover the faked packet by 
masquerading the fact that the sender spoofed data packet will not be responsive to any packet from the 
receiver. Two different approaches combining ACK-PK will be used 
 
1. Request the sender to delay sending packets 
2. Request the sender to recovery a packet 
 
IP Identification Number 
As mentioned earlier in the Bounce Scanning, the sending host normally increase the identification number 
(IP) in the IP header through each packet send. Given that IP identification number can easily be altered, 
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thus making all the alterations calculable. Compared with TTL, IP ID can be used to detect spoofed IP 
packets despite the attacker sitting onto the same subnet as the target. 
 
In a very simple way when we sent inquiring packets to the so said “claimed” source we expect to receive a 
reply, therefore the IDs should be very close to the previously received one from the host. Yet the packets 
should be slightly higher than the IDs’ in the controversial case. Therefore, we can infer that the packets 
sent out where not from the claimed source. It is also totally true that, if the host is bounded with the so 
called “source” is considerably active; the ID’s will change speedily. 
 
With this approach, it is not unfamiliar to come across certain system that unfortunately changes the 
initiating IDs using a more complex methodology rather than incrementing by a constant number. To be in 
accordance with the RFC 791, Postel, J., (1981) mentioned that for fragmented packet assembly to be 
possible, only the ID numbers have to be in a successive order. Therefore this will favor more complex ID 
numbers. These can hence be overcome in 2 different ways. Firstly we could use a separate counter for 
every packet and secondly use a pseudo-random value which will have for aim to limit the actual IP data 
stream from interfering with each other. In those causes where more complex ID number is being used, 
using this particular approach might become ambiguous. 
Retransmission of packets  
In TCP, the use of sequence number is vital as it helps in determining which packets have already been 
acknowledged. Therefore, an ACK-PK normally informs the receiver of all the packets that has been send 
out together with the sequence number of the successfully received packet. When the packet is received the 
ACK-PK number is compared to the minimum and the maximum values and if less or greater than the 
required value, the packet is dropped thus allowing the connection to be resynchronized by sending out a 
packet with the minimum ACK-PK number. Moreover these replies can still be exploited to examine faked 
packets by probing a packet which has been spoofed from the internal host having an ACK-PK number 
higher than the required minimum value. We hence force a resynchronization ACK from the host being 
forged where if an RST reply is received, we can therefore deduced that the connection has been tampered 
with. 
 
 However, a major concern that arouse with this approach according to Joncheray, L (2001), it will conduce 
to an ACK-Storm since both ends-ie sender and receiver will struggle for resynchronization. Yet, their 
approach is better carried out on a firewall where the fake reply could be seized thus prevent an ACK-
Storm as the interval host will not see the reply. 
PASSIVE APPROACH 
With the passive approach, we can hence say that monitored data will have a predicted value as we can 
learn what values are to be expected and hence separate the packets that don’t fit the expected norms. Since 
TTL values are dependable upon the hosting OS, the network topology, the packets protocols are fairly, 
static; therefore TTL can be opted as a core support for passive detection. Unfortunately this cannot be 
applied to IP identification Numbers which have a predominantly distinct association with packet and 
consequently eliminate the choice of using a passive approach. 
Passive TTL approach 
As previously discussed with TTL values are a very good way of identifying the different hops that lie 
between both the sender and the receiver’s and i.e. the source and the destination. Therefore, on performing 
a monitoring observation over a lap of time, we can learn the TTL values of specific IP addresses source 
and who deduce what would be their expected values at the host’s side. Most of times, if not nine out of ten 
times, we will come across packets that the host has never come across. Therefore, by comparing the IP 
addresses which are generally the same for the number of hops away. 
 
Nonetheless, to be able to construct a better model for the detection of spoofed IP packets, both passive and 
reactive approaches should be used in conjunction where the reactive methods would be used for when 
certain packets seems dubious. 
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Since passive TTL approaches are very firm and reliable especially when it come network routing attacks 
which normally happened when packets destined for a host are routed to a different host impersonating the 
first host. Unfortunately, this is not entirely classified as packet spoofing due to the fact that these packets 
are still emanating from a valid IP address of the sender. In addition using passive TTL approach will 
definitely act as a routing detector  
RELATED WORKINGS: 
 
So far, there have not been a lot of work relations about detecting spoofed IP packets. Most of the works 
that have been published were addressing different spoofing attacks. The most common one ARP spoofing 
and according to Whalen, S (2001) associated with sending packet through Ethernet MAC of a different 
host than the IP address thus confusing local hosts of the local network to channel the packets to the wrong 
interface onto the network. In accordance to Aura, T. and Nikander, D. (1997), some firewalls make use of 
SYN-Cookies as an approach to reduce the effect of SYN-Flood type Dos. SO basically a SYN-cookie is a 
crypto-graphical ICP sequence number which is related to time, port number, and source IP address. The 
process is quite simple, if a SYN packet is received, instead of going around opening a buffer for the 
connection, the server will send a SYN-ACK-PK with the SYN_Cookie thus creating a stateless 
handshake. However, when an ACK-DK is acquired from an inactive socket, the returned sequence value is 
verified and compared if it is a valid SYN packet which was sent out from the host. Provided that the 
sequence number is valid, then only a buffer is allowed and hence begins the connection else the packet is 
dropped. This method is somehow used to mitigate SYN-flood attacks but not detect spoofed packets. 
CONCLUSION: 
 
Tracing IP packets have got a few limitations, such as tracing beyond corporate firewalls. To be able to 
effectively traceback the IP addresses, we need to be able to reach the host from where the attack where 
initiated and hence the difficulty of tracing back these IP packets through corporate firewalls and when 
trying to get the last IP address would show the firewall address. 
 
However, detecting spoofed IP packets goes well beyond simple detection. Since faked packets are among 
the most common attacks, therefore identifying them at an earlier stage and hence preventing them in 
occurring will be of a major help to improve the network security. Though this paper we have shown a 
large range of techniques available in detecting spoofed packets. These various techniques and approaches 
can either be used on their own or could be combined to enhance detection effectiveness due to their ease 
of implementation. Yet we do understand that all the discussed methods above are not entirely complete as 
an attacker can still transmit spoofed packets which remain undetected. We also need to keep in mind that 
there is no such system which is fully –ie 100% reliable. There approaches are not the entire solution but 
they greatly contribute to increase the detection of spoofed IP packets. 
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